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PREFACE

There are now grounds for suspecting that the
world policy of the United States, based as it is
upon ever-growing military forces, is reaching a
point of diminishing returns.
It is our thesis that this year's debate on the military budget, as the Wall Street Journal has suggested, l should reach beyond the hardware to the
fundamental strategies for strengthening our security, and more wisely exerting American leadership.
In that context we offer this series of papers.
These papers, prepared by specialists whose fields
bear directly on the central question of our security,
are intended to open a national discussion on
whether:
- our military overkill capability is beyond all
reasonable levels;
- substantial reductions in the military budget
would detract from America's imposing military power;
- present emphasis on military spending is weakenIng our economy;
- overseas military efforts are undermining our
dollar as a unit of international exchange;
- we could improve our security by meaningful
foreign aid measures;
- our foreign military assistance program is torpedoing democratic aspirations and contributing little toward assuring liberty for ourselves
and others;
- transfer of resources from military to civilian
sectors could be accomplished without jolting
dislocations;
- such a shift would enable us to alleviate the
gnawing poverty now afflicting a segment of
our population and to establish markets where
government relief offices now operate;
- ways are opening for more productive foreign
aid;
- the quality of our lives and those of our children
could be vastly improved with the launching of
a constructive American program of world
activity.
To meet the challenge of a constructive American
program in support of freedom, based upon the
still-unmatched industrial system of the United
States, the Soviets would be compelled to take disarmament far more seriously than they do now. For

otherwise, the continued strain upon their resources,
making it impossible for them to meet a bold U. S.
economic challenge in the world, could force the
Soviet Union into a permanently second-class political-economic position.
1

"Defense Debate," January 24, 1963
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I. HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER IS ENOUGH?
by SEYMOUR MELMAN*
Soon after President Kennedy presented a 1964
military budget request totaling $56.7 billions, Secretary of Defense McNamara told us, "We calculate
that our forces today could still destroy the Soviet
Union without any help from the deployed tactical
air units, or carrier task forces, or Thor or Jupiter
intermediate range ballistic missiles" 1.
The military fact behind this judgment is an
American military overkill capability that exceeds
almost anyone's comprehension. The idea of "overkill" is a thermonuclear invention. Never before
could one think of military power sufficient to kill a
population more than once.
The purpose of this paper is to indicate the relative military posture of the two major powers in
terms of overkill. Additionally, we will mention the
relative military manpower requirements of the western and eastern blocs.
U.S. COULD OVERKILL SOVIET UNION 1,250 TIMES
In 1963 about 3,400 strategic weapons-major
aircraft and missiles-are available to the U.S. Air
Force and Navy (see table). These major vehicles
can deliver warheads with explosive power equivalent to 22 billion tons of TNT. The bomb dropped
on Hiroshima, which killed 100,000 people, was the
equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT. The stockpile of
nuclear warheads is probably twice the number deliverable by the major aircraft and missiles now on
hand.
To determine the possible military significance of
this much nuclear power, let us enter upon some
calculations that are at once nightmarish and realistic. In this study we will designate the relationship-100,000 persons killed by 20,000 tons of
TNT-a "Hiroshima equivalent".
On the entire surface of the earth there are now
about 2,000 cities of over 100,000 population. These
cities have a total population of about 600 million. 2
If everyone of these cities was a target for nuclear
destruction, given an allowance of 30 per cent failure to deliver to target, the United States strategic
vehicles alone could deliver the equivalent of 2112
million tons of TNT for each 100,000 inhabitantsor 125 "Hiroshima equivalents". This fact means, in
effect, that the United States at this time possesses,
on a global scale, an overkill capability of 125 times.

In the Sino-Soviet bloc, the population of approximately 370 cities equals approxitnately 1,400
"Hiroshima equivalents". Again, allowing for 30 per
cent attrition of delivery weapons, U. S. overkill capability for the entire Sino-Soviet area is 500 times.
Finally, the Soviet Union alone contains roughly
140 cities of 100,000 population or over-altogether, approximately 500 "Hiroshima equivalents".
Allowing 50% failure to deliver warheads, the U. S.
alone could deliver about 25 million tons per "Hiroshima equivalent", amounting to a U.S. overkill
capability of 1,250 times.
In these calculations, we have excluded any contribution that might be made by fighter planes, intermediate and short-range missiles, torpedoes, mines,
cannon, and tactical rocket launchers like the "Davy
Crockett".
MORE CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS ALSO SHOW
OVERKILL ABILITY
It is possible to estimate U.S. overkill capability
on the basis of other assumptions. For instance, if
one assumes that one megaton (one million tons of
TNT equivalent) is the average yield of an ICBM
warhead, and that a one-megaton bomb is the size
most likely to be delivered to most cities of 100,000
or more population, then the following results would
obtain:
- For the 2,000 major cities of the world, the
U. S. has an overkill capacity of 7.6 times, allowing for a 30% attrition of delivery systems.
- For the 370 major cities of the Sino-Soviet
bloc, the U.S. has an overkill capacity of 41
times, allowing for a 30 % attrition of delivery
systems.
- For the 140 major cities of the Soviet Union,
the U.S. overkill capacity is 78 times, even allowing for a 5070 attrition of carriers.
Within any technically plausible framework of
reasoning, the conclusion is that the U. S. possesses
* Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering, Columbia University; The Peace Race, George Braziller, Ballantine
Books, N. Y., N. Y., 1961; Dynamic Factors in Industrial
Productivity, John Wiley, N. Y., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956;
(ed.) Inspection for Disarmament, Columbia University Press,
N. Y., N. Y., 1958.
1 UPI dispatch January 31, 1963.
2 H. Hoyt, World Urbanization, Urban Land Institute, Washington, D. C., technical bulletin 43, April 1962.
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overwhelming nuclear destructive capability. If the
size of these forces seems unreasonable, that is all
the more striking when it is understood that they
were designed by men whose avowed purpose was
to erect a retaliatory force of such power as to make
a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" on the United States look
like a patently unworkable proposition, and thereby
preserve the peace. It seems that the institutional
machine, once set in motion for these purposes, developed a momentum of its own to generate the
present condition of overkill.
USSR COULD OVERKILL U. S. 145 TIMES
The destructive capability of Soviet forces is estimated by the same reasoning applied to U. S. forces,
with some modifications (see table). On the same
basis as our first set of calculations, the Soviet Union
would have the following capabilities:
- For the 2,000 cities in the world of 100,000 or
more population, no overkill capacity if a 30%
attrition rate is applied to delivery systems.
This is so because with about 2500 delivery
vehicles, 30% losses would leave less than one
vehicle per target. However, if one figures,
arbitrarily, an attrition rate of 20%, then USSR
delivery capability would be 3.2 megatons per
100,000 persons in the major cities-or an
overkill of 160 times.
- For the 404 NATO area cities of 100,000 people or more, the Soviets could deliver about 9
megatons per 100,000 city people, allowing for
a 30% attrition of delivery systems. This is an
overkill capability of 450 times.
- For the 192 U. S. cities of 100,000 or larger,
USSR medium-range vehicles are excluded and
an attrition of 50 0/0 is assumed. Yet the Soviets
could deliver about 2.9 megatons per 100,000
city people-an overkill factor of 145 times.
WEST SURPASSES EAST IN MILITARY MANPOWER
NATO forces in 1963 total 5.9 million persons,
of which the U. S. accounts for 2.8 million. Total
Western alliances forces are 6.6 million in 1963.
When forces of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are
added to these, the armed forces of the U. S. treaty
powers come to a grand total of 8.0 million.
Total Communist-bloc forces are 7.7 million for
1963. Of these, USSR accounts for 3.6 million;
USSR plus Warsaw Pact nations, 4.6 million; China
2.4 million. North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba
account for 0.7 million.
2

The U.S. has 5.68% of its male labor force in the
armed services. The USSR figure is estireated at
5.5 0/£ 3.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS
Operational in 1963

Weapon System

Total Yield
(megatons)

Yield per
Vehicle
(megatons)

Number of
Delivery
Vehicles

B 47 bombers

6,000

10

600

B 52 bombers

12,000

20

600

B 58 bombers

2,000

United States

20

100

120

(1) est.

120

Titan 1 missiles

50

(I) "

50

Titan 2 missiles

30

( 1) "

30

500

(1) "

500

1,000

(1) "

1,000

Skywarrior A-3D Navy aircraft 150

(I) "

150

0.5

240

Atlas missiles

Minuteman missiles
Skyhawk A-4D Navy aircraft
Polaris submarines (15 with
16 missiles each)
Totals

120

3,390

21,970

Note: Table does not include smaller planes, intermediate and
short-range missiles, torpedoes, mines, cannon, tactical
rocket launchers ("Davy Crockett").
Source: Congressional Record, Jan. 16, 1963, pp. 393-416, report
of study by Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

(megatons)

Yield per
Vehicle
(megatons)

Intercontinental missiles

1,875

25

75

Long-range bombers

4,000

20

200

Soviet Union (estimated) Total Yield
Weapon System

Number of
Delivery
Vehicles

Su bmarines (10-12 est.
carrying 10 missiles each) 100-200

1

Medium-range missiles

3,500

5

700

Medium-range bombers

14,000

10

1,400

500

50

Su per-in tercon tinen tal
missiles
Totals

23,975-24,075

100-200

10 (est.)
2,485-2,585

This adds up to approximately 2,500 delivery vehicles carrying
24.0 billion tons of TNT equivalent, and breaks down to:
Long range:
485 delivery vehicles carrying 6.5 billion tons
TNT equivalent.
Medium range: 2,100 delivery vehicles carrying 17.5 billion
tons TNT equivalent.
Note: Medium range missiles and bombers are included in estimate of Soviet strategic weapons (though not in the U. S.
estimate) because the shorter-range Soviet weapons could
be directed to European cities and other areas adjacent to
USSR.
Source: Congressional Record, Jan. 16, 1963, pp. 410-412.
New York Times, January 19, 1961.
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Congressional Record, January 16, 1963, p. 398.

2. THE MILITARY BUDGET- IS THERE A CHOICE?
by

SEYMOUR MELMAN

The massive overkill capability of present u. S.
military forces makes a careful review of the proposed fiscal 1964 military budget a matter of urgent
public concern.
In order to facilitate discussion of the military
budget in Congress and among the American public, three possible national defense budgets for fiscal
1964 are outlined in this paper (see table) .
ADMINISTRATION BUDGET REQUESTS

$56.7

BILLIONS

The administration budget for fiscal 1964 requests authorization for spending $56.7 billions.
The implication is that the available overkill capability is insufficient and needs to be enlarged. J ustification for this expansion has not been clearly set forth.
On the contrary, Secretary of Defense McNamara
has made it clear that the U. S. already possesses the
capacity to destroy the Soviet Union without requiring the use of smaller aircraft or smaller missiles.!
Until recently, the "counterforce" concept of
national security has appeared to have the full endorsement of the Secretary of Defense. This policy
scheme includes the perspective of developing nuclear military capability of sufficient size to overwhelm Soviet forces, if necessary, in one blow, without sustaining intolerable losses to one's own side
from a counterblow.
The "counterforce" perspective has been rendered
implausible by the development on the Soviet side
of the same sort of "hard" missile locations and submarine carriers for missile launching as developed
by the U. S. Under these circumstances, the "counterforce" perspective reflected in the Administration
budget has no military reality - all apart from the
political or human considerations that surround
such schemes.
Accordingly, this paper suggests a second military budget reflecting the concept of maintenanceof-present-forces.
MAINTENANCE-OF-PRESENT-FoRCES BUDGET
SET AT

$34

BILLIONS

The maintenance-of-present-forces budget is based
.on the assumption that existing military forces include enormous destructive capability and that
major additions to these forces serve no plausible

function. On these grounds, the Administration
budget has been reviewed with the aim of formulating a budget plan which makes possible full maintenance and operational performance of the forces
now in being, but does not provide significant additions to the present overkill capacity. On this basis,
the military personnel items in the budget are left
intact, as are the operations and maintenance requests. However, the procurement item is marked
for a sharp cut-from $16.7 billions down to $6.7
billions.
Similar reasoning underlies the cut in the research, development, and testing budget-reducing
that item from $7.2 billions to $200 millions. The
justification for major military research and development has been that this effort is required to attain
and hold military superiority over the Soviets. The
technologies of nuclear weapons, alone, have now
developed to the point where a great variety of
alternative methods are available for delivery of
nuclear warheads. These include missiles of all sizes,
bombs carried by planes, underwater mines, cannons, short-range rockets, and even "bazookas."
Warheads of the very largest size may be delivered
swiftly by intercontinental missiles or may be set off
from a great distance with the warhead lying below
the surface of the sea in the form of an underwater
mine. Offensive capabilities have become so varied
and deadly that there is no basis for assuming the
feasibility of constructing reliable defensive systems
against all possible warhead delivery methoas. Defensive methods of every conceivable sort can be
saturated and overwhelmed by the variety and quantity of offensive weapons.
On the offensive side, destructive capability, having already gone far beyond the overkill mark, calls
for no further improvement on military grounds.
Addition to overkill is no gain. The multiplication
of overkill capability, although without military
meaning, can be understood as one aspect of a
technological race that is run for its own sake in the
spirit of an international sporting event.
We do not argue that the basic scientific research,
now financed by the military agencies, should be
discontinued. Rather, this sort of work should be
1 UPI

dispatch, January 31,1963.
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assigned where it belongs-under the National Science Foundation.
While maintenance-of-present-forces may require
an extension of family housing for military personnel, it does not require further military construction.
The civil defense item is excluded here on the
grounds that the civil defense concept is technically
faulty and is politically dangerous. (See data and
analysis in S. Melman, No Place to Hide, Grove
Press, N. Y., 1962.) Civil defense is a "useful" instrument mainly in relation to "counterforce"
schemes-a major civil defense program announces
an intention to strike first.
The military assistance item is eliminated for reasons given in Part 6 of this series of papers. Further
enlargement to the already massive military assistance expenditures abroad serves no constructive purpose for the U. S.
The atomic energy item would be reduced by twothirds under this alternative budget. It is assumed
that about two-thirds of the Atomic Energy Commission budget is used for operating the large manufacturing plants at Oak Ridge, Paducah, Hanford,
and elsewhere. As the warhead stockpile of the U. S.
is a multiple of the warheads that can be carried by
all present delivery vehicles, it makes no sense at all

to continue operating these plants and filling warehouses and caves with further nuclear warheads.
The Selective Service System is allowed its full
budget request and is part of the maintenance-ofpresent-forces concept. The stockpiling of strategic
materials is eliminated as are the various additions
to em'ergency preparedness programs.
Altogether, the estimate for maintenance-of-present-forces budget amounts to $34 billions, a reduction of $22 billions from the Administration budget.
FINITE-DETERRENT BUDGET SET AT

$9.2

BILLIONS

The description of the finite-deterrent concept
and an indication of its efficacy were put most succinctly by Jerome B. Wiesner~ now scientific adviser
to President Kennedy. Wiesner wrote in 1960:
... "Studies made independently by the U.S. Army
and Navy have indicated that, even in the absence
of [international] agreements limiting force size
and permitting inspection, 200 relatively secure
missiles would provide an adequate deterrent."1
The finite-deterrent concept includes the mainte1

Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," in D. Brennan (ed.) Arms Control, Disarmament and
Na tional Security, George Braziller, N. Y., 1961 , p. 220.

THREE POSSIBLE NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETS
FOR FISCAL 1964
Major Military Functions

Administration
Budget

Military personnel
Present programs ........ .... .... ........... ... $13,235
Pay increase .. ....... ... ...... .......... .... .. .. ..
900
Operation and maintenance ...... ......... ...
11,792
Procurement ...... ........ ....... ..... .............. ..
16,725
Research, development, tests ....... .......... .
7,262
Mili tary construction ... ....... ..... ..... .... ... .
1,232
Family housing ......... ... .... ............... ... ... .
734
300
Civil defense ..... ... ..... ... ... ........ .............. .
1,480
Military assistance ......... ............. .... .. ..... .
2,893
Atomic energy .......... .................... .. ... .. .
Defense Related Activities
28
Strategic materials stockpile ............. .
38
Selective Service ... ............................ .
Emergency preparedness ..... .. ...... .... .. .
52
Present programs ....................... .. .
30
Proposed ................................ ... .... .
Totals .. ... ................ ..... ...... .... ... . $56,702

Maintenance-ofPresent-Forces
Budget
(In millions of dollars)

$13,235
900
11,792
6,725
262

FiniteDeterrent
Budget

$3,500
4,200
1,000

734
893

500

38

$34,580

$9,200

Source: Proposed Administration budget from The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964, U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1963, p. 61.
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nance of a limited but powerful system of delivery
vehicles and warheads so emplaced as to be reasonably secure against attack. These would threaten an
aggressor with destruction of his country as a predictable punishment for an act of aggression against
the U.S.
The 940 strategic missiles in place in 1963 (landbased and submarine) are far in excess of the 200
units postulated by Dr. Wiesner.

This finite-deterrent budget includes funds for
the operation and maintenance of all these delivery
vehicles as well as substantial aircraft and land
forces and would add up to overkill capability if
applied to the Soviet Union.
This finite-deterrent budget is $9.2 billions-and
would represent a reduction of $47.5 billions from
the military budget proposed by the President for
the 1964 fiscal year.

3. MILITARY EMPHASIS BLAMED FOR STATE OF ECONOMY
by

o

SEYMOUR MELMAN

The basic industries of the United States are becoming non-competitive not only in the world market, but even within the United States. The concentration of U. S. capital investment and technological
talent on military activity is at the root of this decline.
The American shipbuilding industry produces fine
products, but at so high a cost and price as to be uncompetitive in the world shipbuilding market. Industrial plants in America's Midwest have recently been
drawing their iron and steel requirements-not from
nearby American industry but from Belgian and
French sources of supply. Until the recent round of
severe price cutting began, the heavy electrical
machinery manufacturers were having increasing
difficulty in meeting European competition in the
world markets and at home as well.

U. S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY LOSES RANK
The pages of American journals that specialize
in machine tools disclose increasing advertising of
foreign-built machines. The American machine tool
industry, once a leading world producer, is now in
fourth or fifth place in the volume of its output. The
typewriter industry in the U. S. as recently as 1948
supplied virtually all U. S. requirements. It now only
supplies 60 % of the typewriters that are sold here
each year. The remainder are imported, mainly from
European factories.
The machinery-producing industries of the U. S.,
whose products amount to about 15 J1o to 20 % (by
value) of all our manufacturing, are in a deteriorating condition. There are notable exceptions such as
the earth-moving machinery industry.
The common feature of this industrial decline is
the failure of the managements involved to produce
the capital for research and new equipment that
would raise the productivity of labor and thereby

offset the higher wages of American labor. Such investment is required if U. S. industry is to produce
the products that can be competitive on the world
and domestic mark~ts.
High hourly earnings of labor can be combined
with mechanization and industrial engineering to
produce goods at low unit cost and price. That is a
basic lesson of America's industrial experience. But
the competence of modern technology has been
withheld from a major section of our civilian economy.
The process of deterioration at the base of America's manufacturing is seen in the statistics on the
age of manufacturing equipment. In 1962, the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. reported that its survey of
overseas operations by American industrial companies indicated that less than 25 % of the U. S.
firms' foreign plants and equipment were purchased
before 1950, while 60 % of the productive facilities
within the U. S. were bought before 1950 1 •
The failure of U. S. firms to replace aged equipment is shown in the critical machine tool industry.
There are about 2.2 million machine tools in the
U. S. If these were being replaced at the average rate
of once every ten years, then there would be an
average annual requirement of about 220,000 machines for replacement alone. During recent years,
the actual output of America's machine tool industry has been in the range of 40,000 to 50,000
machines per year.
Moreover, a considerable proportion of the machines of new design, such as the sophisticated
numerical control equipment, have been on order
for manufacturers of military products. This means
that ' the civilian sector of American industry has
1

American Machinist Magazine, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co .•
Nov. 26. 1962.
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been depleting its machinery efficiency even more
than is revealed by the statistics. The manufacture
of military goods, however intricate, results in no
further production. These goods are end products,
having no further productive use.
MILITARY ApPLICATION OF MACHINERY
IS ONE REASON FOR LAG
This characteristic of military products-that they
are an end product-is at the root of the recent differences in industrial growth rate between the U.S.
and the countries of the Common Market. From
1953 to 1960, the Common Market countries increased their industrial production by 71 % and the
U.S. increase was 19-%. From 1950 to 1960, the
countries of the Common Market increased their
output of all goods and services by 103 %. The
U. S. increase for this same period was 76 per cent.
These differences in total activity were amplified
in the industrial markets of the world. Thus, from
1954 to 1961, manufacturers' exports from the
Common Market countries rose by 128%. U.S.
manufacturing exports rose by only 51 %1.
MILITARY SPENDING, CAPITAL INVESTMENTU.S. AND COMMON MARKET (1960)
United States

Military expenditures as %
of GNP
9.2%
Machinery and Equipment
as % of GNP
5.4%
Source: Statistical Abstract 0/ the U. S., 1962.

Common Market

4.2%
10.2%

These differences in industrial growth between
countries of the European Common Market and the
United States have their roots in the contrasting
emphasis on activity in military and civilian production. The table above shows military expenditures
and investment in machinery and equipment- each
in the percent of the gross national product (GNP)
for each territory. The display of the table is that of
an inversion between the U.S. and the Common
Market countries with respect to military expenditures and investment in new machinery and equipment. The greater emphasis on new means of production in the Common Market countries generates
the higher rate of growth and the increased competitiveness of the manufacturing industry in that
area.
MILITARY WORK CUTS DEEPLY INTO SOME
GOODS AND SERVICES
The 10% of U.S. gross national product used for
military purposes is not an average 10% of goods
6

and services. The 10% contains well over half the
nation's scientists and engineers whose services are
used for military purposes.
Senator Hubert Humphrey reported to the U. S.
Senate, Small Business Committee (Aug. 29, 1962)
that in the United States the federal government
pays for about 65 per cent of all research and development, mostly military, and that:
In Germany, 85 per cent-85 cents out of
every research dollar - is private, and less than
15 per cent goes into military and space. Eightyfive cents of that goes into the civilian economy,
so'that today the German plant competition for
world markets of civilian goods is being automated, modernized, equipped in the latest and
best fashion, and new products are developing,
while we are developing new wrappings. Weare
the greatest packagers in the world ... In Japan,
it is about 85 to 15 again .. .in England, which
also has a low rate of economic growth, as does
our country, 60 cents out of every research dollar is governmental and goes into military and
space, atomic energy ...
What is happening to our civilian economy
as we plow more and more of our scientific personnel, our brains, into the military and into
space and into atomic energy for military purposes? Where are we going to end up in this
trade competition with these Belgians and these
Dutch, who are clever, and the Germans, who
are very clever, who are spending more money
for civilian aspects and will develop products
cheaper, better, and more serviceable?2
Progressive decline of U.S. civilian manufacturing industry, owing to these causes, will result in
progressive deterioration of competitive position in
the domestic market as well. An important assessment of our civilian deficit was recently given in a
report of the Engineering Research Committee of
the Engineers Joint Council. 3
Correction of these tendencies requires a shift in
the use of money and technical manpower from
military activities to the civilian economy. A first
step in accomplishing this shift would be the blueprinting of the conversion from a . ~ilitary to a
civilian economy; by firms, communItIes, and governments.
U.K. Board of Trade Journal, Nov. 23, 1962; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961 and 1962.
2 Cited in The Nation, Feb. 16, 1963, p. 133.
3 The Nation's Engineering Research Needs, 1965-1985, 1962
(EJC, 345 East 47th St., New York 17, N. Y.).
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4. AMERICAN DOLLAR IN JEOPARDY
CAN FLIGHT OF GOLD BE HALTED?
by TERENCE MCCARTHY*
The claim is made that the enormous annual expenditure on armaments and the military establishment in this country is vitally essential to the maintenance of America's world position. It is nearer the
truth to say that without a shot being fired, without
United States armies once engaging the enemy, her
world position is being frittered away, irretrievably,
by America's tacit repudiation of the basic value of
her currency.
I t is true that gold is still exchanged for dollars
and dollars for gold at $35 per ounce. But the ability to continue doing so grows less and less as the
months pass. The accumulation of foreign shortterm claims upon U. S. gold reserves, despite the
willingness of foreign central banks to help alleviate
temporary difficulties, will undermine the employment of the dollar as the banking currency of the
world. This is precisely how sterling was undermined as a world currency in 1931.
However she may try to escape this trap of her
own making America cannot remedy the situation
until government expenditures are brought within
reasonable bounds. And this cannot be done so long
as almost 10% of the gross national product is allocated in military expenditures financed by debt.
The purpose of this paper is briefly to review the
embarrassing erosion of U. S. gold reserves and to
suggest reasonable and prudent action to curb this
erosion.
U.S. GOLD STOCKS LOWEST SINCE 1939
From the end of 1949 to February, 1963, the
monetary gold stock of the U. S. Treasury shrank by
$8.7 billions-from $24.6 billions down to $15.9
billions. The February balance was the lowest figure
for the nation's gold reserves since May 10, 1939.
The loss in gold was $100 million in the first two
months of 1963 alone. This drain occurred despite
reciprocal currency arrangements with leading foreign banks and the Bank for International Settlements, designed to counter speculative attacks on
the dollar and to avoid hemorrhage of gold reserves
when foreign central banks accumulate dollars in
excess of amounts they deem prudent.
This drainage of U. S. gold stock is not some

short-term phenomenon caused by malproportions
which will correct themselves in the natural course
of events. It is a persistent problem, arising from
sales of gold to foreign governments and central
banks in settlement of continuing U.S. deficits in
the balance of international payments. In 1962 the
overall deficit on international account totalled $2.2
billions~ and the drain on U.S. gold was $912 millions. In 1961 the deficit was $2.5 billions and the
loss of gold was $877 millions. In the three years
1958-1960, the U.S. experienced deficits in its balanc.e of payments averaging $3.7 billions per year.
The total adverse balance in the five years ending in
1962 approximated $15.8 billions.
DEFICITS PERSIST DESPITE FAVORABLE
TRADE BALANCE
The most significant aspect of the balance of payments deficits is that they have occurred in the face
of a very large excess of merchandise exports over
merchandise imports. During 1955-1961, U. S. exports of merchandise to all the world totalled $122.9
billions and the merchandise imports totalled $95.1
billions - giving a net balance in America's favor of
$27.8 billions. Yet the loss of gold in these seven
years amounted to $4.8 billions. The stock of monetary gold shrank 22 %, even though U.S. commercial
sales of merchandise abroad far exceeded purchases
from other countries.
For years past it has been a feature of U. S.
national policy that a favorable balance of trade on
merchandise account has financed government expenditures overseas. During 1955-1961, net exports
by the U.S. Government totalled $28.1 billions, consisting of $14.8 billions in military supplies and
services abroad, and $13.3 billions in other exports, including all kinds of non-military services
abroad, grants, credits, aid and assistance programs.
Government net exports during those six years were
almost exactly equivalent to the favorable net balance of trade on merchandise account-$28.1 billions in government exports, $27.8 billions in merchandise trade.
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To put the matter another way, 53% of the gain
in international merchandise transactions had been
spent or dissipated in all sorts of military ventures
overseas. The balance has been used up in equally
costly although, in some instances, both unavoidable
and constructive, expenditures by the U. S. Government in all areas of the Free World.
If there were no greatly complicating factors bey~nd this equation of net merchant gain and government spending abroad, there might be no real cause
for concern. One could question whether U.S. resources in all cases were being employed in ways
beneficial or detrimental to the national and the
world's best interests. But there would be no need
to fear erosion of the foundations of the economy by
constant pressures against the-dollar.
U.S. ROLE IN WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM
Is JEOPARDIZED
However, the matter is much more complicated.
The role which the United States has assumed in
world affairs, specifically its role in the world's
monetary system, does not permit this fair equality
between a favorable merchandise trade balance and
overseas expenditures to harmonize international
payments and international receipts. U. S. international deficits persist, and the national currency is
increasingly jeopardized in spite of the continued
excess of commercial exports over imports.
Nor, for that matter, does the continued movement away from the dollar reflect a weakening of
America's position as a creditor nation. In 1940 the
U.S. was a debtor nation; long term assets and investments held by foreigners in the United States in
that year totalled $13.5 billions-almost $1.3 billions greater than American investments abroad.
This debtor status persisted through 1945. But by
1950, America had become a massive creditor with
$32.8 billions of investment assets abroad, compared with $19.5 billions of foreign investment
assets in the U.S. This position of $13.3 billions of
creditor status in 1950 grew enormously, so that by
1961 the U.S. had become a creditor on long-term
account to the tune of $27.3 billions.
Yet gold has continued to seep out of the country. This happens, not because governments and business organizations overseas mistrust the basic credit
standing of the United States, but because they have
come to mistrust profoundly the ability of the dollar
to continue to serve as the foundation currency of
the world's monetary system, in view of the fiscal
8

policies consistently pursued by this country.
The situation is classic. For just as U. S. Government expenditures in foreign countries are offset by
a favorable balance of merchandise trade, so the
massive creditor status of the U. S. on long-term investment account is offset by her debtor status on
short-term account. Short-term liabilities to foreigners reported by banks in the U.S. as of December, 1962 amounted to $25 billions, of which $12.3
billions consisted of U. S. Treasury bills and certificates. Short-term claims on foreigners reported by
banks in the U.S. totalled only $5.1 billions, leaving
the U.S. a net debtor on these short-term accounts
to the extent of $19.9 billions. Here is where the
difficulties lie.
The situation resembles that of Great Britain.
That once-dominant nation was forced off the gold
standard in 1929-1931 because of her inability to
realize her long-term foreign investments in time to
stem the flight of gold as short-term liabilities were
pressed upon her for payment.
The United States today is in much the same position. Rising costs-of-living, increased production
prices, unsatisfactory returns upon industrial investment, and resulting industrial stagnation - inescapable accompaniments of persisting inflation induced
by fantastically costly arms expenditures financed by
debt increases - have caused American capital to
seek more profitable and more secure investment
opportunities abroad. Hence the $27 billions of net
credit on long-term investments overseas. The selfsame factors have caused foreigners to keep their
dollar holdings in short-term forms, and not to convert them into long-term investments in the U. S.
These foreigners are understandably fearful that the
decline of the dollar cannot be arrested while the
U. S. national debt continues to mount and the foreign exchange earned from trade is prevented, by
fiscal and military policies, extravagance abroad and
at home, from being converted into Treasury balances.
THE SOLUTION LIES IN CURBING
MILITARY SPENDING
The gold problem is of America's own making.
The solution must be of her own finding. Prompt
and major reduction of arms budgets for both home
and overseas forces, with the bulk of the savings
going to bolster U. S. gold reserves, are prerequisites
to remedying the situation. Or, such expenditures
must be paid out of current taxation, not out of debt

increases, no matter how unpalatable a rise in taxation may be.,
Whoever fears that the adoption of such a drastic
surgical policy toward the national budget may
weaken U.S. influence in the world, might reflect on
the British experience. The decline in England's
position as a great power dates, not from the end of
World War II, but from the time the international
financial community recognized that England could
no longer meet her short-term obligations with
assurance, and that sterling could no longer serve as
the base of the international monetary order.
Once thoroughly weakened, world financial power

cannot easily be regained. The U.S. has attained a
world position through the integrity of her currency.
She will lose this, together with the ability to shape
much of the world's political future, if the flight of
gold is not soon halted. This can be done only by
curbing the extraordinary extravagance in the military area, and by strengthening the U.S. fiscal position so that short-term claims upon her gold reserves
will be transformed into long-term foreign investments in the American industrial system.
Statistical data sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin (monthly);
Statistical Abstract of the United States (annual).

5. WHICH WAY SECURITY? HOW WE CAN COUNTER
GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
by

OTTO FEINSTEIN*

The foreign economic and military practices of
the United States have not addressed themselves successfully to the key problems of the 1950's and
1960's. Chaos, instability, and the threat of nuclear
war, based on the poverty in the under-developed
countries is increasing. The United States could
direct its resources in a way that will add substantially to the security of this country even as it extends the opportunity for greater economic and
political freedom to that , two-thirds of the world's
population living in misery and squalor.
The burden of this paper will be to indicate that:
- the under-developed countries are the major
source of world instability, presenting threats
to world security that are not susceptible of
military solution.
- unless present trends are reversed, the economic gap between developed and underdeveloped countries will continue to widen.
- foreign aid from the developed countries has
been niggardly compared to the funds allocated
for military efforts.
- there are means of using foreign aid that promise enduring benefits.
- such expenditures address themselves to the
key problems of world security.
- the U.S. has more to gain from such constructive efforts than from continuing to add to its
military overkill capability.

POVERTY, UNREST THREATEN WORLD'S SECURITY

Since 1945, there has been no military conquest
of any important area that was not an outgrowth of
World War II. All the troubles since 1945 have
arisen from the disequilibria resulting from the
breakup of previously under-developed empires,
anti-colonial disturbances in the under-developed
areas, or revolts against military regimes in those
areas.
47 countries that have been "trouble spots":

Laos, Vietnam, Algeria, Argentina, Arabia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cyprus, Ghana, Rhodesias, British
Guiana, Borneo, Malaya, Pakistan, Burma, China,
Congo, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon,
Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Angola, South Africa, Spain,
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey , Venezuela, and Yemen.
Poverty and unrest in these under-developed areas
is the major cause of world instability. (The Rus-
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sian and Chinese revolutions can also be traced to
problems of instability in under-developed countries
under severe political strain.) The military problems
that may have existed, or may now exist, arose out
of the economic, political, and social problems of
under-development.
The overkill capability which has been developed
by the world's annual $120 billions military budgets
has' not and cannot resolve the problems in the
under-developed countries. Few of the "trouble
spots" may be said to have presented a basically
military problem. In all these cases, the use of military force has been, at best, a temporary solution
and often an irrelevant one. As a matter of fact, the
massive use of capital, technology, and human skill
for military purposes aggravates the problems of the
under-developed areas by increasing the scarcity of
these resources and thus raising their price.
ECONOMIC GAP THREATENS TO WIDEN FURTHER

That two-thirds of humanity live in wretched
poverty has been the subject of much commentary,
in recent years. However, the basic and alarming
feature of this problem has yet to be recognized: the
gap between the developed and the under-developed
countries is increasing.
Over the past 18 years, while more than 60
under-developed nations have gained independence,
national efforts and international co-operation in
their development have so far failed to bring about
the desired acceleration of economic growth. The
average growth in per-capita income over the past
decade was less than 2 % and possibly as little as
1 %. The average level of real income per capita in
the under-developed countries is now less than onesixth-and in many cases less than one-tenth-that
enjoyed in such countries as Belgium, Norway and
the United Kingdom.
A study of the trends in per capita income (see
Table 1 following text) in major areas of the world
clearly indicates the widening of the gap between
the developed and under-developed nations. The
predicted population growth (Table 2) 1 will further
aggravate this situation. Even according to a moderate hypothesis of this growth the population in the
developed zone of the world will grow by 53 %
while that of the under-developed areas will increase
by 146% by the year 2000. This means that the
proportion of people living in the presently developed areas will drop from 33.9 % to 22.9 %, while
the proportion of those living in the under-devel10

oped areas will rise from 66.1 % to 77.1 % of the
world population.
Furthermore, food production per capita has actually been declining or rising only minutely in these
areas (see Table 3). And while three-fifths of the
human species lives in these areas, they produce
only one-third of the world's agricultural output.
While the bulk of humanity is thus slipping into
poverty, rather than evolving out of it, the major
industrial nations, as well as the under-developed
ones, have been spending increasing sums on military budgets. Despite the obvious and inherent dangers in such a continued trend, the absolute gap
between the rich and the poor countries has been
widening.
FOREIGN AID INSIGNIFICANT BESIDE
MILITARY BUDGET

In the fiscal year of 1959-1960 over $120 billions
was spent for direct military purposes. 2 This sum is
between 66% and 100% of the total national income for all under-developed countries during that
year. Total world foreign aid and assistance has
never reached 10% of the world military budget.
U.S. aid has accounted for more than 75% of all
foreign aid. But all U.S. foreign aid from July 1945
to December 1961 was only one-and-a-half times
the size of one year's American military budget. A
large share of even this modest amount of aid has
gone either to developed countries or for military
assistance. In all, the U. S. has spent $33 billions
during the past 17 years for non-military aid to the
under-developed countries. (Table 4) 3
In proportion to U.S. productivity, however, our
share of foreign economic aid has been small. If we
take 1959, and ask what share of the national income of the developed nations went to the underdeveloped nations in the form of economic aid, we
find that France led with 1.9% and was followed by
the U.S. with 0.7 0;0 , the United Kingdom with 0.5 %,
and West Germany with 0.3 70 . If the United States,
the United Kingdom, and West Germany had given
the same per cent of their national income as France,
foreign aid for 1959 would have been $10.7 billions rather than the $4 billions which it actually
was. Even such a sum would have been quite a bit
United Nations, Accroissement de la population mondiale dans
['avenir, 1961.
2 United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, New York, 1962.
:I Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.
1

less than 10% of the military budgets for that year
(see Table 5).
NEED FOR CAREFULLY ALLOCATED FOREIGN AID

Four estimates have been made as to the total
amount of foreign capital required by the underdeveloped areas, over and above their domestic resources devoted to investment. 1 These estimates
range from $6 billions to $10 billions annually.
After allowing for the present flow of foreign capital,2 there is a current deficiency between $3 billion
and $6 billions a year if the modest annual rate of
growth of 2 % in per capita income is to be achieved.
Even this would be but a minimal program. In essence, the only answer to the massive problems of
the under-developed areas is to increase the productivity of their labor, natural resources, and capital.
Economic theory now indicates that investment
in human capital is the key to economic development with productivity and capital formation as
secondary results. Thus, the most effective investment of foreign aid would be in education-primary,
secondary, vocational, and technical.
A number of advantages would flow from educational aid. Teachers and intellectuals could obtain
constructive employment; the influence of the ideologies of violence would be reduced; and a middle
class would be either created or enlarged. Furthermore, the bulk of the people would be given something concrete: advancement for their children and
the possibility of their own advancement. The funds
spent for education would aid in the development of
an effective consumer market even as they stimulated labor productivity and trimmed production
costs.
Nor would this have to be a permanent hand-out.
The program can be instituted in such a way that
our share declines over the years. Popular pressure
would be the factor guaranteeing continual education outlays by the local government, particularly as
more people are educated, more schools are built
and more teachers are trained.
Finally such a program supports social and demographic stability, creates people who can use the
parliamentary tools of progress, increases those
whose interests are jn more limited family size, adds
value to labor by making it more productive, and
creates markets for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs.
From past experience with foreign aid, it is evident that billions of dollars can be used without

establishing any permanent stability or growth. It is
therefore essential that aid lead to the point of selfgenerating growth. Filling the capital gap by achieving the aid level of France and investing in an extensive educational program are two such practical
aid suggestions.
FOREIGN TRADE KEY TO DEVELOPMENT

A key generator of economic development which
uses the power of the market mechanism to induce
growth is foreign trade. In 1960 total exports of the
under-developed areas amounted to four times all
foreign aid and investment from the industrial
countries. In most countries more than 20% of the
national product originates from foreign trade. It
provides the foreign currency, technology, profits,
and often government revenues that make internal
growth possible.
But here too the gap between the rich and the
poor is widening. The under-developed areas' share
in world exports has declined from 32% in 1953 to
25 % in 1960. Total exports since 1956 from the
under-developed countries have increased by only
2 % while those from industrial areas have grown by
6.5 %. While the pattern of trade has shifted from
export of primary commodities and import of manufactured consumer goods, to export of primary
commodities and import of capital goods (a positive
development), the value of raw materials per dollar
output of the industrial countries has declined. In
1900 raw materials comprised 22Y2 cents of every
$1 output of the U. S. economy; in 1960 only 11112
cents of every dollar output consisted of raw materials value. This decline has been most rapid since
1940. The extreme fluctuations of raw material
prices has also seriously affected the economic stability of the under-developed countries. GATT estimates that billions of dollars have been lost due to
these fluctuations.
1

2

United Nations, The Capital Development Needs of the Less
Developed Countries.
United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of
Underdeveloped Countries, 1952.
M ax F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal, Key to an
Effective Foreign Policy, New York, 1956.
Paul G. Hoffman, One Hundred Countries, One and OneQuarter Billion People, Washington, 1960.
P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Under-developed Countries," Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume XLIII, May 1961.
During the past few years, the total net flow of capital
from private-enterprise-developed countries to under-developed areas averaged between $3.5 billion and $4 billion
annually. Half represented official grants and the remainder
consisted mostly of private lending.
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The removal of U. S. restrictions against primary
products from Latin America would result in increased yearly earnings for that area of $850 millions to $1.7 billion a year. Rapid economic growth
in the U.S. and the opening of U.S. markets for the
under-developed areas' products would be the greatest aid to their development.
A reduction of the overkill budget resulting in a
sizeable tax cut could help provide such an increase
in U.S. economic activity. The utilization of the
vast research talent, now in the defense area, for
mapping development plans and producing new and
low cost capital goods would greatly facilitate trade,
efficiency and growth.
U.S.

GROWTH ESSENTIAL

To

WORLD

DEVELOPMENT

Representatives and officials charged with allocating our nation's wealth in a way that will best protect our freedom and our security should have a
clear idea of the threats which jeopardize these cherished rights. It is the belief of this author that events
since 1945, as well as the obvious problems looming on the horizon, indicate that the threat is currently more closely connected with the problems of
under-development than with those of direct military or nuclear attack. It would seem folly to divert
funds and talents in a direction where the problems
seem to be coming under control while practically
ignoring the vast and complex problems facing us.
It is fortunate that the solution of the problems
of under-development would help resolve some of
our internal problems, such as unemployment and
insufficient economic growth. .

TABLE 1

Population (millions)
1960

1975

Africa ........................... .....
235
Asia (Not Japan) .... ..... ... 1,525
South America .............. ... .
139
Central America ............. .
66
Total Under-de veloped .. 1,965
Japan .............................. ..
95
USSR ............................... .
215
Europe ............................ ..
424
North America ............. .. .
197
Oceania ............. .......... .. . ..
16
Total Developed .......... ..
947
Grand Total .............. .. 2,912

303
2,093
204
99
2,699
117
275
476
240
21
1,129
3,828

1990

2000

410
2,951
304
151
3,816
139
339
540
283
26
1,327
5,143

517
3,717
394
198
4,826
153
389
568
312
30
1,452
6,278

TABLE 2

Food and Agricultural Production per Capita
1948/49 1953/54
Before
to
to
1958/
U1ar 1952/53 1957/58 1959

1959/
1960

Western Europe .................. 100
96
110
113
117
108
123
145
145
East Europe and USSR. ....... 100
North America ....... ............. 100
112
110
111
111
91
93
97
96
Latin America .. .................... 100
Oceania ................................ 100
95
95
102
100
Far East (Not China) ........ .. 100
84
92
94
95
Near East ............................ 100
99
109
114
112
Africa ............ .. .............. .. ...... 100
102
107
105
102
All areas ........ .. .............. .. 100
99
106
113
113
91
97
99
98
Under-developed areas ...... 100
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization, World Food and
Agricultural Report (1960), p. 14.

TABLE 3

Trend of Per Capita National Income in Major Areas
1913

North America
(Excluding Mexico) .. .. $917
572
Oceania ....................... .......
454
Northwestern Europe ...... ..
162
Soviet Union (USSR) .... ..
Union of South Africa .... ..
177
Southeast Europe ............ ..
200
Latin America ................ ..
170
Japan ....................... ... .. ..... .
85
Far East (excluding
China and Japan) ........ ..
93
65
Southeast Asia ........ .. ....... .
50
China ................. ............ .. .. .

1929

1952-53

1957

$1,243
680
528
178
221
181
196
152

$1,810
964
681
535
300
285
260
184

$1,868
1,110
790
750
318
360
300
240

106
68
50

109
64
50

115
67
61

A program of foreign aid in the form of bank
credits, grants for massive educational efforts, and
accelerated foreign trade will lead to economic
progress, political stability, and social development
in the under-developed areas. Such conditions would
inevitably encourage the flow of private direct foreign investments and might even lead to the rebirth
of long-term portfolio investments and other capital
market features.

Index (1913==100)
North America
136
197
(excluding Mexico) ......... . 100
119
169
Oceania ...... ...... ..................... . 100
150
116
Northwestern Europe .......... .. 100
110
330
Soviet Union (USSR) ......... . 100
125
169
Union of South Africa ......... . 100
91
143
Southeast Europe ................ .. 100
115
153
Latin America ...................... .. 100
179
216
Japan .......................... ........... . 100
Far East (excluding
114
117
China and Japan) ...... ....... . 100
105
98
Southeast Asia ................... ... 100
100
100
China ....... ............................ .. . 100

If such changes are not made, or if only halfhearted measures are taken, then social unrest, increasing instability, and guerilla wars will plague us
within a very short time.

Note: Figures in dollars of 1952-54, not corrected for differences
in price levels between countries.
Source: L. J. Zimmerman, Arme en rijke landen, Albani, The
Hague, 1960, pp. 29-31; from Jan Tinbergen, Shaping
the World Economy, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, p. 9.
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204
194
174
463
180
180
176
282
124
103
122

TABLE 4

United States Foreign Aid (in billions of dollars)
1 July 1945 to 31 December 1961
Total
1961-57

Net non-military grants ........ 36.8
8·4
Net credits .............. ............ 12.8
1.9
Net other aid (PL480, etc.)
3.0
1.9
Net military grants ... .. ... .... .. 29.3
10.2
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.

1956-51

1950-45

11.2
1.6
1.1
17.2

17.2
9.3
2.0

TABLE 5

Foreign Aid from 1954-59 (in millions of dollars)
West Germanyl ........
Belgium ...... .

274.5
54.2

Australia .. .. .
Canada ....................

181.6
215.3

TABLE 5 (Cont.)
France ..... ................ . 2,825.9
Italyl ....................... .
72.9
Japanl ..................... .
53.2
Netherlands ............ ..
133.0
Switzerland ....... .. ... ..
.6
342.0
USSR and bloc2 ....... .

Denmark ........ ..... .....
.7
U.S.A . .. .. .................. 12,025.5
]'J')rway ....................
6.1
l\ew Zealand .......... ..
23.3
United Kingdom .. .... 1,058.7
Sweden ......................
4.3
Total-$18,271.9
Source: Department of State Bulletin, 22 August 1960 and J. S.
Berliner So viet Economic Aid, Praeger, New York, 1959.

Germany paid $428 million, Japan $200 million, and Italy $181
million in reparations to under-developed nations.
2 Soviet and Eastern bloc figures are from 1953-57.
1

6. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF
DOUBTFUL VALUE IN LATIN AMERICA
by

EDWIN LIEUWEN*

Despite more than a decade of operation of the
present United States military assistance program in
Latin America, the military power and war-making
potential of those nations to the south counts for
practically nothing. The Latin American armed
forces have shown a marked unwillingness to combat collectively the communist threat 'e ither from
without or from within the region itself. For instance, only Colombia responded to the U. S. call
to arms in Korea. And there was little concerted
action in the case of Guatemala during the period
1950-1954 or in the case of Cuba today. Thus, as a
purely military proposition, the concept of collective planning and defense would seem to have little
or no practical application.
The purpose of this paper is to review briefly the
elements of the U.S. military assistance program in
Latin America and to appraise its effects on both
the U. S. and Latin America. From this case-study,
it is possible to draw conclusions on the value of
such programs in a vital region of the world.
U.S.

MILITARY AID PROGRAM

Is

EXTENSIVE

Under the U.S. Mutual Security Act, military
assistance to Latin America is granted for the purpose of obtaining the cooperation of that area in resisting any threat to security of the hemisphere. The
assumption is that there is a threat by communist
aggressors both fro~ without and within and that
resisting that threat is a common responsibility.
This collective defense machinery consists of:
1. A military a1liance-The Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947.
2. A collective defense planning organizationThe Inter-American Defense Board.

3. A U. S.-sponsored military nusslon system
under which the armies, navies, and air forces
of all the republics, except Mexico and Cuba,
receive training and instruction from U. S.
military personnel.
4. A military school program for Latin American
officers and men at institutions in the U. S. and
the Canal Zone.
5. Military assistance grants in the amount of approximately $55 million annually to eleven
countries - Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Chile,
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and Guatemala-with
whom the U. S. has military defense assistance
pacts.
6. Credit sales of military equipment in the
amount of approximately $25 million annually to all the Latin American countries except
Cuba under the reimbursable aid provisions of
the Mutual Security Act.
7. Sales of U. S. military equipment in virtually
unlimited quantities at bargain prices.
OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM ARE MAINLY POLITICAL

Though expressed in military terms, the objectives of the U.S. military assistance program for
Latin America are primarily political. Realistically
recognizing the major role played by Latin America's armed forces in the internal political life of
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America, 86th Congress, 1959.
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their respective countries and recognizing their desire for arms, the U. S., during the past decade, has
been granting military assistance primarily as a quid
pro quo for Latin America's friendship and cooperation. Military assistance has been frequently justified
on the ground that it helps preserve internal stability in Latin America.
While it is true that the U. S. influence over Latin
America's armed forces helps exclude Soviet influence there, it is questionable whether our security position is always thereby advanced. In countries
where the military now dominate politics, such as
Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, the primary opponent of the armed forces is
internal civilian opposition rather than world-wide
communism.
Latin America's armed forces have frequently
employed the equipment sold or granted by the U. S.
to overwhelm civilian political organizations.
"In Brazil, for example, following the receipt of
nearly $300 millions in Lend-Lease equipment and
the sending of a token expeditionary force to Italy
during World War II, the armed forces assumed the
right to depose President Vargas when the war was
over. According to Laurence Duggan, the United
States equipment and experience in European fighting built up the role of the officer corps in the country's politics; thenceforth they began making and
breaking governments. Again in 1954, following
receipt of more military aid and the assumption of
a new defense-of-the-hemisphere role with the signing of the 1953 MDA Pact, they arrogated to themselves the right to depose Vargas again, although
this time he had been freely elected to the presidency.
In Colombia, prior to the military coup of 1953,
the army had been receiving both grant and reimbursable aid from the United States. The officer
corps, its confidence bolstered both by its fighting
role in the Korean War and by its assumption of
the task of 'preserving order' during the civil war,
could not resist the temptation to seize power.
United States military aid must certainly be considered as one contributing factor that helped to tip
this balance, bring the Colombian army back into
politics after a half-century of civilian rule ...
The strengthening of the armed forces, for defense or for preserving internal order, seems only to
give encouragement to the Latin American officer
corps to convert themselves into even more highly
political instruments than they are already. The in14

tentions of the donor are, as in the past, perverted
by the recipients."l
Recently, Senator Ernest Gruening (Dem.
Alaska) reported that:
"1. A military coup overthrew the existing government of Peru last July even as the Presidential election ballots were being counted. Army officers invaded the Pizarro Palace, seized and imprisoned
President Manuel Prado and established themselves
in power.
The tank which crashed through the palace gates
was a Sherman tank made in the United States and
supplied by us to Peru as a part of our military-aid
program. The officer who carried out the capture of
the palace, Colonel Gonzalo Briceno, was trained
at Fort Benning, Georgia. Others of the junta and
of its military cabinet likewise received their training in the United States. Several had been only recently awarded the U. S. Legion of Merit: in their
citations, services to the 'objectives of democracy'
were stressed.
Seven candidates had been vying for the Presidency in Peru; three were closely bunched far in the
lead. They were General Manuel Ordia, a former
President who had come into power in 1948 through
a military coup; Fernando Belaunde, candidate of
the Popular Action Party; and Raul Haya de la
Torre, long the head of the moderate left-wing antiCommunist APRA Party. None of these had secured
quite the one-third of all the votes cast required by
the Peruvian constitution, which provides that in
such an event election shall be by the Congress. The
military apparently feared tl:lat Haya de la Torre
would be chosen and would institute what to them
were objectionable social and economic reforms. To
prevent this they took over.
The Kennedy Administration promptly announced that aid to Peru under our foreign aid program would be suspended, and withheld recognition
of the new government.
2. Several weeks earlier, a similar sequence of
events had taken place in Argentina. There the military, dissatisfied with the results of the general elections, seized President Frondizi, imprisoned him on
an island and installed a creature of their own, Jose
Guido, in his place. The Kennedy Administration,
however, recognized the new Argentine regime and
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Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger,
New York (1961), pp. 230, 231.

continued its aid. Shortly thereafter, several hundred
million dollars were pledged."l
Although reluctant to fight communism abroad,
the various forces of the Latin American military
have not hesitated to use U.S. given equipment to
conduct internecine warfare. During the November
1961 political crisis in Ecuador, air force jets battled army tanks and troops in downtown Quito. In
June, 1962, army tanks, troops, and air force jet
fighters battled a marine corps battalion for control
of the Puerto Cabello Naval Base in Venezuela.
Three months later, the cavalry (tank) branch of
the army and the air force successfully fought the
infantry, which was supported by the navy, in the
streets of Buenos Aires for control of the Argentine
government. And in November of 1962 the air
force battled the army for three hours in Guatemala
City, the main casualties being innocent civilian
bystanders.

seem to be the case wherever military assistance
tends to abet the kind of stability that puts a damper
on social change and reform.
We should be extremely wary of conservative
forces' solicitude for military assistance, for their
aim is to use it not to halt Soviet aggression from
without, but rather to suppress social change from
within. In Nicaragua, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay,
Ecuador, and Guatemala, where an unintended effect of U. S. military assistance has been to stifle
reform, the result has been to break down the
barriers between the Communists and true democratic forces, both of which tend to see their immediate enemy as the military of their own country. As the recent case of Cuba has amply demonstrated, the Communists are quick to seize the opportunity to cooperate and make common cause with
the democratic civilian resistance to militarism.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL FRUSTRATE

MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTES LITTLE
TO DEMOCRACY

Does military assistance thwart the progress of
democracy in Latin America? Insofar as military
aid programs have increased the political influence
of the armed forces, the prospects for democracy
appear to have suffered. The military tends to resort
to non-democratic procedures to achieve internal
order and stability, which both the local military
and the U.S., for different reasons, ardently desire.
The 1962 military take-over from freely elected
civilian governments in Argentina and Peru are
cases in point.
Does the political advantage of gaining the cooperation of Latin America's armed forces with
military assistance outweigh the disadvantages of
alienating democratic civilian elements by the continuance of such aid? It matters little whether the
U. S. arms are really the determining factor in provoking military intervention in internal politics. The
point is that most civilian elements believe this is
true.
It should be borne in mind that U. S. military assistance to Latin America is supported only by that
area's military forces comprising less than 0.5 % of
its total population. Most civilian forces are opposed
to these programs, fearing their own armed forces
far more than they do the Russians.
Finally, our military assistance programs in Latin
America appear incompatible with social reform
objectives of the Alliance for Progress. This would

"ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS"

Conclusions expressed by this writer three years
ago still hold true: "For the great majority of Latin
Americans, who see no great danger of aggression
from outside, the U.S. military program compounds
their internal problems, interferes with the process
of social change, and hinders progress in economic
development. The reimbursible aid program, the
evils of which are magnified by the new credit
policies, gives license to the armed forces to squander money on flashy military 'toys' ... the provision
of U. S. arms to military regimes often stymies the
popular urge to political freedom."2
Viewed in retrospect, the present military assistance program for Latin America is a somewhat
anachronistic carry-over of a fundamental decision
made 15 years ago. At that time our cold war policy
for Latin America reflected the strong military influence prevailing in our foreign policy.
In 1947 the Defense Department proposed to include Latin America in our cold-war strategy via
alliances, arms, aid, bases, and a general military
build-up. The late Gen. George C. Marshall, then
Secretary of State, overruled his subordinates and
accepted the military proposal. Thereafter, as the
cold war intensified, military and strategic considerations were increasingly emphasized in U.S. forErnest Gruening, "Exporting Trouble," The Nation, October
6, 1962.
2 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger,
New York (1961), pp. 240.
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eign policy toward Latin America.
The subsequent social crisis in Latin America,
however, has made the military considerations increasingly untenable. The political freedom, social
reform, and economic development principles out-

lined in the "Alliance for Progress" program appear
to be inconsistent with our military assistance programs in Latin America. Unless this inconsistency
is removed, frustration and failure may crown our
whole Latin American policy.

7. CIVILIAN MARKETS FOR U.S. MILITARY INDUSTRY
by

JOHN

E.

Reduction of military spending to a maintenanceof-present-forces level would result in a budget cut
of $22 billion. As this represents a substantial
amount of economic activity, we feel it incumbent
on us to suggest alternative markets and activities.
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest alternative expenditures. Their sum exceeds the proposed
reduction by a substantial margin.
But first it should be noted that it would not be
necessary to seek alternatives for the full amount if
it were deemed fiscally advisable to convert some of
the saving into a tax cut. For example, such a policy
might permit sustaining the entire tax-cut program
proposed by the Administration - $13.6 billionswithout administrative and legislative countervailing
moves that would partially neutralize it. In line with
this kind of reasoning, the President's Labor Management Committee in the fall of 1962 recommended a $10 billions cut without concurrent reform.
SOME ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE
SELF-LIQUIDATING

The alternatives that will be suggested involve
government initiative in varying degrees, but not
necessarily the federal government. Some activities
such as urban renewal are probably best handled on
a local or regional basis. Some of the alternatives
envisioned are self-liquidating and may be carried
out by private enterprise. These alternatives would
replace the military procurement which is supported
entirely by the federal government. Such procurement, of course, represents expenditures that do not
return their capital outlay.
The alternatives differ considerably in the extent
to which they can be used to employ existing staffs,
managements, and facilities. It is desirable to conserve existing institutions, whether they be firms or
government agencies, by finding them other tasks.
This is important in order to prevent stranding of
populations and dislocations of the kind that are dif16
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ficult to cope with on the local political level. Individual conversion problems would occur, but would
be susceptible of solution, provided an adequate
level of economic activity was maintained.
SCHOOLS NEED

$5

BILLIONS MORE A YEAR

In 1961, expenditures for public primary and secondary schools was at a level of $455 per pupil. This
outlay included capital improvements which made
up about 17 % of the total. Increasing these percapita expenditures to a level approximately halfway between the national average and that for the
highest state (New York), would require about $5
billions. Raising them to the New York level ($678)
would mean an extra $9 billions. An increase of
approximately $8 billions per year was recently suggested by the American Association of School Administrators.
At least one-third of these amounts could now be
profitably invested in new teaching aids such as educational television and other audio-visual aids, thus
providing a market for the electronics industry.
An additional $500 millions should be earmarked
for further aid to higher education. This would be
in the form of scholarships for technical specialists
previously associated solely with military work to
enable them to retrain for equivalent professional
jobs in non-military endeavors.
$10

BILLIONS NEEDED FOR URBAN RENEWAL

Estimates on the need for urban renewal vary
greatly and range up to the complete rebuilding of
large sectors of all our metropolitan areas. Expenditures up to $110 billions a year have been suggested. 1 No effort of this size could be mounted

* Professor of Management; Chairman Department of Management, Marketing and Business Statistics, Hofstra University;
professional engineer; consultant in urban planning and industrial development; "Economics of Nuclear Power," Science,
April 4, 1958; "Depreciation, Equipment Prices and Income
Tax," Engineering Economist, Spring 1960.
1 U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 70.

promptly without gravely dislocating the entire construction industry, currently operating at a rate of
$70 billions annually. This figure includes private
and public construction and maintenance. However,
additional construction expenditures on the order
of $10- to $15-billions would be in order without
severe dislocation of the industry. With preparation,
the industry could be expanded to handle a much
greater work load. The $10- to $15-billions figure
would represent an expansion of construction activities of 14 % to 21 %, allowing for the elimination of
military construction which now runs about $1.2
billions a year.
The new scale of effort would be substantially
more than is currently planned. For fiscal year 1964,
total federal outlays for housing and community development are estimated at $276 millions, excluding
the trust funds of Federal National Mortgage Association. I
Existing industry in the military field could provide manufacturing capacity for prefabricated units
and the required administrative and planning staffs.
$4 BILLIONS NEEDED TO RECLAIM DAMAGED LAND
The total damaged land of the United States has
been estimated at 778 million acres. 2 A further 280
million acres have been rendered useless for agriculture. Assuming that all activities of the Army Corps
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation are
directed toward conservation, the average reclamation expenditure is $1.04 an acre. This amount could
certainly be increased. An expenditure of $5 per
acre of damaged and ruined land would represent an
added expenditure of $4 billions. This is little
enough for land improvement. Substantial increase
of effort will be urgently needed before the end of
the next two decades if suburban settlement continues encroaching on farm land. 3
URBAN TRANSIT WOULD REQUIRE $500 MILLIONS
Plans for mass urban transit have been made by
many metropolitan areas and have reached the stage
of specific plans in several localities. Annual expenditures envisioned for a few l,?calities are as
follows:
Bay Area (San Francisco) ... .. . $100 millions
Washington, D. C ..... .. .... ...... ... .
100 millions
New York City-Nassau County
100 millions
All others .................. ..... ..... .. .. ..
200 millions
Total ... .... ... ..... .. ........ ... .. ..... . $500 millions
These projects are in various stages of planning

and financing. As noted, funds for these largely selfliquidating projects do not necessarily have to come
from federal sources.
Transit systems also offer opportunities to electronics firms in the supply of controls. The vehicle
market thus created is already attracting sectors of
the airframe industry, in addition to regular suppliers.
$1.5 BILLIONS COULD BE USED
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
Federal public health expenditures for fiscal year
1964 are estimated at $1.6 billions. This amount is
an 18 % increase over fiscal year 1963 appropriations. Even so, the fiscal 1964 federal budget points
to the inadequacy of medical staffs, the need for
more hospitals, and the modernizing of existing
facilities. A further $1.5 billions could justifiably be
spent. This would include substantial amounts fOl
up-to-date diagnostic equipment and the automation of hospital operation, providing potential markets for firms with electronic capabilities. An effort
on this scale would speed the solution of major
mental and physical health problems.
ALTERNATIVES WOULD REQUIRE
$32- to $44-BILLIONS
Summarizjng alternative expenditures suggested
thus far we have:
Item

Cost (Billions of dollars)

Education ....... ....... .. ... .......
Urban renewal ...... .. .. ....... .
Conservation, soil renewal..
Urban transit ........... ... ......
Public health ... .... .. .... .... .... .
Net tax cut .. ..... ........ .........
Totals ............................

5.5
10.0
4.0
.5
1.5
10.0
31.5

- 9.5
- 15.0

- 13.6
- 44.1

The alternatives proposed could quite easily ac·
commodate cuts of $22 billions that would be possible with a maintenance-of-present-forces budget.
The programs suggested are based on activities
likely to be of vital national importance in the
future.
There is pent-up demand for a wide variety of
rehabilitation and recreational projects-ridding our
air and our streams of pollution, developing our
park areas, protecting our shores agah?-st erosionthat would require a wide variety of research and
Federal Budget for Fiscal 1964, p. 92.
R. Rienow, American Problems Today, D. C. Heath, Boston
(1958).
3 E. F. Higbee, The Squeeze, Morrow, New York (1960).
I
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mechanical skills and a healthy boost in expenditures. Desalination of sea water, for which the Interior Department now has some pilot projects
(1964 Budget request is 12 million dollars) is but
one activity that would have national and international significance, and which could be funded
from savings in the military budget.

Altogether, the reallocation of military expenditures as suggested in this paper would permit considerable choice as to method of organizing the investment of capital. The adoption of any of these
alternatives would have a tonic effect on the economy and would allow us to proceed with long-deferred projects of rehabilitation and improvement.

8. A NEGLECTED HOME MARKET- 38 MILLION
AMERICANS IN POVERTY
by JOHN E. ULLMANN
" ... for all its wealth and progress the U. S. has still
too much distress and poverty in its midst, and . . .
here surely is one frontier which clamors for attention."
-John Davenport
"In the Midst of Plenty"
Fortune, March 1961, p. 107

The task of eliminating poverty in our society has
languished for the past decade while we have devoted ever greater resources to the military effort. A
redirection of our economy would allow us to correct these imbalances.
With nearly 10Yz million families and almost 4
million unattached individuals living in poverty in
1960, the total comes to approximately 38 million
Americans - more than one American in every five.
The total of those with annual incomes of less
than half the amount required to place them above
the poverty level, involving in 1960 nearly 3 V3 million families and almost 2 million unattached individuals, comes to 12Yz million Americans-about
one in every 14.
My purpose here is to sketch very briefly some
aspects of the problem of poverty in the United
States and to indicate a few approaches to alleviating the problem. The shift of resources from the
military to the civilian section of our economy
would greatly facilitate the elimination of this national problem.
SOME AS·P EeTS OF AMERICAN POVERTY

The number of Americans living in poverty was
reduced very rapidly from the depression level
reached in 1935-36 to about 38 million in 1960.
The number with less than half the income required
to lift them above the poverty level was reduced to
about 13 million by 1953, with no further reduction
by 1960.
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The nature of poverty has been well described in
Poverty and Deprivation in the U. S.: The Plight of
Two-Fifths of a Nation, Conference on Economic

Progress, Washington, D. C., April, 1962:
"In 1960, there lived in poverty 43 Yz % of the
families whose heads were unemployed; 42% of the
families whose heads were laborers elsewhere than
on the farm or in the mine; 37% of those whose
heads were service workers other than in private
households, and about 58% of those whose heads
were farm operators. Two-thirds of hired farm workers earned less than $1,000 a year.
Among families in the South, 68% lived in poverty or deprivation. Among all U.S. nonwhite families, 80% lived in poverty or deprivation.
Among multiple-person families with heads aged
65 and over, nearly two-thirds lived in poverty;
among unattached individuals 65 and over, fourfifths. Among families whose heads had less than
eight years of elementary education, only about oneseventh were above the deprivation level. III health
and inability to work because of physical defects,
and substandard housing, are far more concentrated
among the poor and the deprived than among
others.
Stated in another way, looking at all people living in poverty in 1960, far more than a fourth were
in consumer units (families and individuals) where
the head was not employed. Far more than half
were in units whose head had eight years of education or less; and almost a third were in units whose
head was female. About a fourth of the total number of people living in poverty had consumer unit
heads aged 65 and over. More than a fifth were
nonwhite. More than a sixth were farm people.
More than two-fifths lived in the South.

About two-thirds of all farm workers in 1959
earned less than $1,000 annually in money wages,
including not only their earnings from farm work
but also their earnings from nonfarm work. The
total number of days worked per year was shockingly low. The average annual money wages were
only $1,025 for a man and $447 for a woman ·for
migratory workers, and only $1,278 for the man
and $3! 4 for a woman for nonmigratory workers."

improving the productiveness of 38 million Americans, and thereby boosting their purchasing power.

REDUCTION OF POVERTY, HIGH ECONOMIC

1. The stimulating effects of a tax cut would tend
to be concentrated in consumer and capital spending for goods and services. Many of the industries
involved would thereupon be able to operate at
higher levels, thus reducing unemployment, and
with it poverty, in the depressed industrial areas.

GROWTH Go HAND IN HAND

There are those who, giving priority to higher
economic growth, say that this priority has little
bearing upon reduction of poverty and deprivation.
They give as their reason that most or much of these
low-income conditions exist in "pockets" of the
economy or are due to "special" causes-such as
under-developed or depressed areas, lack of education or skills, bad health, lack of personal discipline,
and discrimination based on age or sex or color.
These factors are present and require attention,
but they explain only a fraction of the widespread
poverty and deprivation today. For while many people are poor because they are uneducated or in bad
health or low morale, the cause and effect is just as
frequently in the reverse order. Similarly, people
may be without jobs because they are unskilled, or
vice versa.
To be sure, the weaker claimants are likely to be
the first to be skipped when there is not enough to
go around, but the main difficulty lies in the shortage of total economic opportunity. Periods of high
economic growth and reasonably full utilization of
productive resources have generated the most rapid
reduction of poverty and deprivation. Any workable
program for economic growth in the future must
include the very programs and policies which would
remedy the "special" causes of poverty and deprivation.
20%

OF U.S.

Is

AN UNDEVELOPED MARKET

These 38 million Americans living in poverty are
virtually no market for either soft or durable consumer goods. Their purchasing power is restricted
to the barest requirements for sustenance. The marketing implication is that about 20 % of the American domestic market remains to be developed by

DIVERSION OF MILITARY SPENDING
WOULD SPUR SOLUTION

The alternative budget allocations to domestic
efforts (Part 7) and to international efforts (Part 9)
would make it possible to advance the solution of
these problems. Let us examine a few possibilities:

2. Increased spending on education would make
it possible, along with other steps, to correct the
lack of training which is a handicap of the poor.
3. A vigorous effort to solve the problems of public health would certainly direct itself to the mental
and physical health of the lowest income groups.
The Michigan Employment Security Commission
concluded on the basis of a study of the "unemployabIes" in Michigan that many were highly demoralized and alienated from their surroundings. Individual counseling was often necessary. A real job
of reconstructing our "damaged" human resources
is feasible in the context of improving our national
health.
4. Urban renewal would mean rehabilitating slums
and blighted areas which generally are inhabited by
the poorest people. Jobs, often of low skill, could
be found on the spot in projects of this kind. Indeed, urban renewal can help provide new jobs for
many displaced by today's automating industry.
5. Agricultural rehabilitation would return a substantial number of the rural unemployed to productive work.
6. An imaginative program of world industrialization, sponsored by the U. S., would reinvigorate
our machine industry and thus give new economic
life to many depressed areas, for example in the
Northeast, the Midwest, and New England. At the
same time, the use of our food-producing capacity
toward this goal would greatly stimulate farming
and reduce substantially the problems of rural poverty.
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9. U. S. FOREIGN AID CAN BE MORE PRODUCTIVE
by

SEYMOUR MELMAN*

"A lot of the criticism of foreign aid is because the
critic thought the objective was to get economic
growth, and this wasn't the objective at all. . . .
The objective may have been to buy a lease, or to
get a favorable vote in the UN or to keep a nation
f~o?I falling ap~t, or to keep' some country from
glvmg the Russians airbase rights, or anyone of
many other reasons."
-~r. D. A. Fitzgerald, former deputy
dIrector of the U. S. International Cooperation Administration; US News
& World Report, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 48.

Since the end of World War II Americans have
supported government programs designed to assist
European recovery from the war and to spur economic development in many parts of the world.
These mutual security programs have been justified
on the grounds of strengthening free societies, offsetting communist expansion, or as humane, constructive acts of a rich society on behalf of the impoverished.
.
The transfer of U. S. military spending to civilian
purpose as suggested in Part 2 of this series would
permit substantial increases in foreign aid programs. However, this would be no license for either
unlimited or wasteful efforts.
The proposals given in this paper suggest possible
ways for accelerating the process for economic development in the rest of the world under such conditions a~d. at such a rate as to enhance the personal
and polItIcal freedom of the peoples of Asia, Africa,
and .Latin America. Emphasis is given in these suggestIons to measures which improve local competence for a development "takeoff" that is locally
powered.
AID PROGRAMS COULD CREATE HUMAN CAPITAL

High rates of illiteracy and a lack of trained people are major factors that hold back the processes
of economic development. We in the U. S. are in a
unique position to invest some "seed money" in the
form of relatively low-cost systems that would make
po~si?le . very rap~d development of literacy and
traInIng In the baSIC mechanical arts.
Television transmission systems with transistorized receivers, powered by solar (or hand-generator
charged) batteries, can reach into the most remote
village at about $150 per set or less. Television is a
dramatically inexpensive device as compared to the
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cost of training teachers (and training teachers to
teach teachers). Breaking the literacy barrier in
many countries means also breaking the barrier for
accelerating economic development on a self-powered basis. Grant money ought to be concentrated
on high-payoff operations of this sort.
MEANS FOR IMPROVING FOOD SUPPLY
AND LAND TENURE

In January, 1962, Morris Forgash1 , presented "A
Plan for an International Bank for Economic Acceleration of Backward Countries" to the Atlantic
Convention of NATO Nations meeting in Paris. The
essenti~l idea here is the use of a major banking
ope~atIon relying primarily on private financing as
an Instrument for accelerating land reform and
thereby economic development in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.
The plan for this bank .was presented on the
basis of an impressive analysis of agricultural productivity and land tenure systems, and the role that
land reform can playas a catalyst in economic
development.
One of the major difficulties in carrying out foreign land-redistribution measures-in Latin America, for example-resides in the unwillingness of the
landowners to accept bonds in exchange for their
excess land holdings. To give them cash as they
would like is often impossible, because of the inflation that would result immediately, but payment in
conventional long-term bonds smacks of outright
expropriation because of the long experience with
inflation.
Acceptance of payments in long-term bonds
could be eased by attaching a purchasing power
guarantee to the principal and the interest of the
bonds-a guarantee that might be underwritten by
the NATO countries. An institution like the International Bank for Economic Acceleration of Backward Countries would actually provide an incentive
to accelerate serious measures toward land redistribution.

* I. am

~leased to acknowledge valuable suggestions for this
discusslOn from Professor Albert O. Hirschman, Department
of Economics, Columbia University.
1 M. Forgash, .President, U.S. Freight Corp., 711 Third Avenue
New York CIty.
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MEANS OF STABILIZING COMMODITY PRICES

During the last decade, prices of raw materials
sold b~ Latin American and other under-developed
countrIes have tended to decline relative to the
prices of industrial goods which these same countries
purchased abroad. The result has been an important
decline in the foreign exchange income of countries
relying on exports of a few primary products.
Ways of dealing effectively with this problem
without interfering with the price system have been
canvassed recentlyl and have resulted in the proposal of an insurance system which, at most, is
likely to cost the industrial countries $500 millions
per year. A U. S. share of $250 millions is indicated.
PROGRAMS SHOULD ENCOURAGE LOCAL
PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT

Undivided ownership of foreign agricultural, minand manufacturing enterprises by U. S. private
Interests turns out to be more and more of a liability
to the U. S. and hamstrings its desire to establish
friendly relations with the governments and peoples
of emerging countries. Attempts to bring local domestic capital into joint ventures have not changed
the picture to any substantial extent. Total direct
investments by U. S. firms in the less developed areas
amount to approximately $14 billions.
It is proposed that the U.S. government announce
a program of progressive local participation in control of these properties, making it possible for foreign governments or their citizens to take over up
to one-half of these properties in a period of ten
years-at an annual cost of $700 millions. This
would be a once-and-for-all operation. Thereafter,
U.S. capital would be permitted to go overseas only
~ng,

if it does not amount to more than 49% of any venture on an equity basis. On the other hand, investment of capital on such a minority basis should receive powerful tax and other incentives - the cost of
such incentives to the treasury may well amount to
$200 millions to $300 millions a year.
Strong sUPi ort has lately been marshalled for
federal insurance on U. S. private investments
abroad. A well-conceived program of U. S. private
investment that is coupled with scheduled increases
in local participation and control could very well
make a program for insuring assets redundant.
MEANS FOR CONTAINING INFLATION IN
UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

There has long been a need to supplement existing project lending as engaged in by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Export-Import
Bank. Bank capital is needed for general-purpose
balance-of-payments and iI?-flation-averting loans.
If projects are successful, this means that they
will have a multiplier effect on more economic
activity and investment through income and linkage
effects. Hence, successful projects will give rise to
additional balance-of payments and inflation pressures unless these pressures are cushioned by the
availability of general-purpose funds. Depending on
the ratio in which such funds would be made available in relation to the "project" funds (a one-to-one
ratio would not be unreasonable), a yearly sum of
$1 billions to $2 billions would be required.

1

United Nations Report, International Compensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade, 1960.

10. FISCAL STRATEGIES FOR SHIFTING $22 BILLIONS
TO CIVILIAN ECONOMY
by

WILLIAM VICKREY*

Managing the shift of $22-billions worth of resources from military to civilian use is no small
assignment. There seems to be no valid military
reason why this diversion should not take place with
all the promptness that can be managed. There are
strong humanitarian and economic reasons for making these resources available for productive and lifeenhancing purposes. The only delay justified is that

needed to avoid gross inefficiency and excessive
hardship resulting from unduly severe and sudden
dislocations.

* Professor

of Economics, Columbia University; recently, consultant to the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization;
author of many economic studies including "Utility Strategy
& Social Decision Rules", Quarterly Joumal of Economics,
November 1960; named Social Scientist of the Year by the
American Social Scientist, 1961.
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While the transfer proposed is a relatively small
one compared to that which took place with notable
success at the close of World War II, the circumstances of the relatively smooth 1945-1946 transition no longer exist. We do not start from a situation of intense high employment, backlogs of demands of all kinds, and accumulated savings and
liquidity in excess of normal to finance the filling of
those backlog demands.
Rather we must start from a period of economic
doldrums in which such unfilled needs as do exist
are poorly supported with effective purchasing
power. But we should recall that while the 19451946 transition proved much smoother than many
anticipated, it was not achieved without considerable thought, planning, and effort. The problem of
engineering an equally smooth transition, even of
smaller magnitude, at this juncture is going to need
more than casual good will.
The key essentials for a program designed to accomplish such a transition are adequacy and flexibility. One certainly cannot expect to produce a
major change in the tempo of a $600-billions economy with minor tax adjustments of $2- or $3- billions a year, particularly if they are spread over
several years in the future, any more than one could
expect to steer the Queen Mary with a canoe paddle.
A shift of $22-billions of resources out of the military and into other sectors, however, is beginning
to get out of the paddle class. The way we handle an
assignment of such a magnitude is going to have
very substantial effects on the economy.
Just what these effects are likely to be, however,
is something for which we have relatively little hard
experience. We have had almost no experience with
deliberate transfers of this direction and magnitude
undertaken from a state of relatively low-pressure
economic activity. We have a number of fairly
reasonable theories as to how this should work out
in a qualitative way, but the success of quantitative
predictions based on such theories in analogous
situations has been only moderate.
PLAN FOR $22-BILLIONS' TRANSITION
MUST BE FLEXIBLE
As we proceed, we shall have to keep close watch
on how measures work out and be prepared to
modify our actions according to their effectiveness
and the readiness of responses. It would be foolhardy for even an experienced pilot to undertake to
get the Queen Mary out of the harbor if he is re22

quired to lash the helm in a fixed position for half
an hour at a time. For an apprentice to attempt this
would be almost certain disaster. We are still no
better than apprentices in the techniques of controlling major shifts in our economy.
With a $22-billions shift under consideration, it
would be extremely dangerous to the health of the
economy to attempt to decide in advance for one or
two years, or longer, just what the magnitude of the
net government contribution to aggregate demand is
to be. Such a commitment would carry grave risks
of allowing the country to run into difficulties of inflation on the one hand or unemployment on the
other. Accordingly, one should not even attempt to
layout the precise magnitudes of the measures to be
taken. One can only indicate alternative directions
which policy might take in dealing with the problems and suggest an over-all strategy for selecting
policies and then modifying them in the light of
developments at monthly or quarterly intervals.
POLITICALLY ATTRACTIVE METHODS COULD
PROVE DANGEROUS
One can indicate from the outset that some
methods of handling a $22-billions shift from military to civilian activity, while politically attractive,
are almost sure to produce poor and possibly disasterous results. Looking at the climate in which
such a shift is likely to be considered, one can think
of groups eager to make the shift primarily an occasion for the expansion of government welfare, international aid, research, and other programs. Other
groups might seize the occasion for tax reduction.
Still other groups would clamor for reduction of the
national debt. In the give and take of political compromise, a program might emerge, calling for, say,
an $8-billions increase in government civilian activities, $7 -billions worth of tax rate reduction, and
projecting $7 -billions worth of public debt reduction-each on an annual basis.
The actual consequences of such a compromise
might well be other than would be naively expected.
A reduction of $14 billions in the amount the government would be directly pumping into the income
stream would be only partially offset by perhaps $6billions of increased consumer spending out of the
$7 -billions of tax reduction.
In the face of this over-all reduction in final demand for goods, any major investment in new production facilities of the funds thus released by liquidation of government bonds, would be unlikely.

One could expect, as a result of such a policy, an
immediate increase of at least 1 % in the unemployed. If the tax and expenditure rates thus adopted
were persisted in, the cumulative effect could well
be the rise of unemployment to levels representing
severe depression. The consequent reduction in tax
revenues would mean a failure to realize the intended
reduction in the national debt. A transfer of this
magnitude from military to civilian activity cannot
be managed satisfactorily on the basis of mere
political compromise. A basically consistent policy
must be worked out.
THERE IS A RANGE OF CHOICES FOR
ACCOMPLISHING SHIFT

Such a shift can be managed in a number of ways
without plunging the economy into a tailspin. It will
require big thinking commensurate with the size of
the problem. Even an $8-billions increase in civilian
government expenditure would mean, in terms of
the federal government, a doubling of all direct nonmilitary expenditures for goods and services.
Conceptually the simplest way of effectuating a
transfer of resources from military to civilian use
would be to expand government civilian programs
at the same pace that military programs are reduced.
This is possible, but would mean a tremendous expansion of government civilian activity. If considered in terms of federal civilian expenditures alone,
it would mean more than trebling them. If considered in terms of the combined civilian expenditures
of all governments-federal, state, and local-it would
mean an increase of over 30 per cent. An attempt to
channel such an increase through the various state
and local agencies, even if largely financed by the
federal government, would necessarily encounter
serious delays.
One of the more attractive ways of applying the
bulk of the resources released from military use
would be to increase our civilian assistance to underdeveloped countries. Admittedly there are difficulties to be surmounted in doing this. On a technical
economic level the problem of maintaining a balance in the flow of international payments is not an
inconsiderable one (See Part 4) .
The balance of payments would not represent a
serious problem if the aid were to take the form of
distributing materials from accumulated stockpiles.
Essentially, however, such a release of stockpiled
materials would have to be in addition to other
transfers of resources, as such a release of itself

would not generate any income or purchasing power
for new products. Thus such aid would not have the
same employment-creating effect as the purchase of
goods and services currently being produced.
ROLE OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

It is not necessary to rely primarily upon big government to absorb effectively the resources released
by a massive military spending cutback. Adequate
stimulation of consumer demand through tax reduction can also do the job if carried out to the required
extent. The difficulty is in rethinking the relationships involved so as to accept the budgetary consequences.
At one extreme the entire $22 billions could be
picked up by about a 6 per cent increase in personal consumption expenditures, but to induce personal consumption expenditures to expand by $22
billions-say, from a $350-billions level to a $372billions level-would probably require tax cuts in the
neighborhood of $25 to $30 billions. In such a case,
there would be no reduction in the national debt.
Rather, there would be an increased deficit. Yet,
this road is a feasible one, as would be various intermediate programs between these extremes.
Military resources can be transferred effectively
to other purposes in a number of different ways.
This will require imaginative policies of appropriate
magnitude and free of mutually inconsistent goals.
One may long for an economy with a low level of
government expenditure, a balanced budget, a stable
price level, and full employment, but with today's
technology and today's demands for individual
security, simultaneous achievement of all four of
these objectives simply is not possible. Full employment with a reduced level of government activity
cannot be had without either an increased deficit or
an imminent threat to price stability. Full employ..ment with a balanced budget and stable prices would
require a greatly increased level of government
activity.
There is of course no gold-plated guarantee that
unforeseen and possibly serious economic problems
may not arise in attempting a shift of this magnitude. The two most obvious threats are of course inflation and unemployment. While both of these are
serious, it would be a mistake to regard them as
threats of equal seriousness. Inflation is indeed theft,
but unemployment is vandalism. Inflation indeed
transfers unjustly a share of the economic pie from
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TABLE I
ILLUSTRATIONS OF HOW FIRST-YEAR MILITARY BUDGET REDUCTIONS OF $22 BILLIONS
COULD BE USED EFFECTIVELY TO CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
A Range of Private-Public-Responsibility Budgets for Using $22 Billions
of Reduction in 1964 Military Budget in Terms of Areas of Deficiency in U. S. Economy
Primarily Private
Productive Initiative

Class of.Activity

U. S. Domestic
Additional Private Expenditure* .. ... ... ....... .. .
Education .. ........... ... ....... ....... .. ...... ..... .. ...... .
Urban Renewal .. ...... .... ... .. .... .. .... ... ..... ..... .. . .
Urban Transit ... ....... .... .. ... .... ....... .... ... ... .. ... .
Public Health ............... .. ....... ....... ......... .. ... .. .
Capital Investment in Human Resources
(Poverty and Depressed Areas) ........ .... ... .
Water, Air, Soil and Other Resources
Conservation .... ..... .... .............................. .
Subtotals ... ............ .... .... .... ..... .... .. ....

Mixed Private
and Government
Primarily Government
Productive Initiative
Productive Initiative
(In Billions of Dollars)

15.0*
1.5
1.6
0.2
0.3

10.0*
2.0
3.0
'0.3
0.7

4.0*
4.0
4.0
0.4
1.0

0.5

1.0

1.3

0.2

1.5

2.5

19.3

18.5

17.2

0.2
2.0

0.3
2.0
0.2
0.3
2.0

World-Wide
Capital Investment in Human Resources ......
Bank for Economic Acceleration .............. ....
Commodity Prices Support .. ...... ... ......... ... .. .
. . ** .... .......... .. ..... .......... .
. I R epatnatlon
C aplta
Loans and Grants ........... ..... ...... ........... .........

0.5

0.2
2.0
0.1
0.2
1.0

Subtotals ... ... ...... .... ...... .. ....... .... ..... ..

2.7

3.5

4.8

Totals ....... .... .... ...... ...... .... ...

22.0

22.0

22.0

*If these additions to private expenditure are to be induced by a tax cut, the cut will have to be larger th an the induced spending; how
much larger being partly conjectural, to be determined on the basis of experience.
**See Part 9 above, Section on "Programs should encourage local participation in investment."

creditors to debtors, but unemployment spills part
of the pie on the floor. Inflation is still compatible
with growth both at home and abroad; unemployment is a waste and a betrayal of our stewardship
of the lion's share of the world's resources. Big government is of course also something of a threat to
free institutions; yet the maintenance of a superficial prosperity on the basis of an extravagant and
even dangerous level of military expenditure is the
very worst kind of "big government."
ILLUSTRATIONS FOR FIRST-YEAR USE OF
$22 BILLION To CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
The figures shown in Table 1 give three alternative ways in which resources released by a $22-billion cut in military expenditures could be applied to
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productive civilian uses. These are illustrations only,
and not in any sense recommendations.
It is to be noted that the figures given in the first
row are the amounts that will be added to expenditures by the public as a result of the tax cut, and
not the amount of the tax cut itself. The tax cut may
have to be from ten to thirty per cent larger than
this, particularly in the first year, to allow .for that
part of tax reduction that will fail to get put back
into effective circulation through increased consumer expenditures or private investment. It is not,
indeed, to be expected that much net additional
private investment will result from the additional
consumer expenditures, since to a considerable extent, such investment would be taking the place of
the private investment formerly stimulated by mili-

tary expenditures. It is likely that the tax cut might
have to be relatively higher in the first year of the
transition than in subsequent years, in order to
assure a prompt and reasonably smooth transition.
In any case, freedom of action should be retained
to permit an appropriate portion of the tax cut to
be rescinded whenever it is no longer necessary to
bolster consumer demand.
The figures illustrate that at one extreme it is possible to provide for almost the entire $22-billion reduction in military expenditures to be reflected in an

immediate tax cut, and still leave room for the
amounts that individuals will decide to save out of
this tax cut to be borrowed by the government and
invested in education and other resource-creating
activities that will increase the productivity of the
economy in future years, and enhance the heritage
that we pass on to future generations. At the other
extreme, it is not at all difficult to develop worthwhile government-sponsored projects that could ab ..
sorb nearly the whole of the resources thus released.
There is a wide range of choice.

11. OUR POLICIES SHAPE THE NEXT GENERATION
by

BENJAMIN SPOCK,

American children, recent studies show, are being
made increasingly anxious by the cold war. Between
25 and 50 per cent of our children in U. S. schools
today expect nuclear attack. The young ones worry
most about being poisoned by fallout, about being
separated from their parents in a disaster, about the
maiming or death of their families and themselves.
Adolescents speak with some bitterness about the
uncertainty of their future, about the possibility of
their giving birth to deformed children, about the
futility of working hard at school.
Children have also been infected with an unhealthy suspiciousness. When a fifth-grade class, for
example, was looking at a picture of the Russian
countryside showing a tree-lined road and one child
asked what the trees were for, others quickly suggested, "So the people won't know what's going on
beyond the road" and "It's to make work for the
prisoners. "
Until very recent times America has been an outstandingly buoyant nation. We have imbued our children with optimism. We have brought them up believing that they would be able to cope with whatever life offered, and so they've usually succeeded.
We've never restricted their vision with narrow traditions or cautions, so they have been extraordinarily creative. We have given them a natural trust
in people and a trust in their own ability to deal
with people. As a result, they've impressed the world
with their self-assured friendliness.
Up to a few years ago, America's influence in the
world was always on the ascendent. Whatever we've
set our minds to-whether it was expanding our ex-

M.D.*

ports, helping to win wars, developing the atomic
bomb, rehabilitating Europe with the Marshall plan
-we've succeeded. But in recent years, we've run
into repeated conflicts with the Communists and we
have had to be satisfied with stalemates. In certain
psychological aspects, we have reacted neurotically
to these setbacks. Instead of calmly pursuing the
course which would serve our long-time aims, we
have often seemed obsessed with the fear of what
the Communists would do to us.
To the degree that we adults become fearful and
suspicious, we pass such attitudes on to our children. Specific studies have shown that when children are taught to fear others, it is always harmful
to their personalities. Educated parents no longer
try to control a youngster with threats of the bogeyman. If an adolescent boy is convinced that members of any group other than his own constitute a
threat to him-physically, scholastically, socially, or
economically, his assurance and ability to deal with
people will be undermined, even though he believes
he belongs to a stronger group.
The exaggerated fear of Communist nations that
will be carried into adulthood by an increasing
number of today's children will lower their optimism, their self-reliance, and their total effectiveness. Furthermore, this fear and its consequences
could be played upon by an unstable leader, just as
fear in Germany was exploited by Hitler, to push

* Professor

of Child Development, Western Reserve University,
Medical School; Baby and Child Care, Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
Inc. and Pocketbooks Inc. (many editions); Problems of
Parents, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1962.
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this country into war. The repercussions of fear of
outside aggression could be extended disastrously
into a wholesale mistrust of all one's fellow men, including one's neighbors.

sary. We in America have the scientific knowledge
and the enormous industrial power to begin to
change the face of the earth now, if we should
choose to do so. Such a course would compel the
Communist nations to follow our lead. Such a
course would give our children not only courage
but a deepening sense of inspiration and dedication.

We will continue to undermine our children's
confidence unless we can substitute positive aims
for passive fears and suspicions. Children respond
to a challenge even more readily than we adults.
The poverty, hunger, disease and injustice that have
always plagued humanity-today as extreme as ever
in many parts of the world - are no longer neces-

For data I am indebted to:
MELVIN ALLERHAND, Ph.D., Western Reserve University
SIBYLLE ESCALONA, Ph.D., Albert Einstein Medical School
MILTON SCHWEBEL, Ph.D., New York University
B.S.

NOTES ON MILITARY STRATEGIES
SEYMOUR MELMAN
ALAN

Conventional Military Assumptions

L.

MADIAN

Strategic Changes Due to Overkill Capability

1. Addition to offensive capability increases military power (or deterrence).

1. Addition to offensive capability in the overkill
range does not add to military power (or deterrence): overkill of 1000 is not greater than
overkill of 100.

2. Defensive systems can effectively protect sufficient numbers to insure an on-going society.

2. All defensive strategies and technologies can
be saturated, overwhelmed or evaded by variety and quantity of offensive power. A 99 o/c
effective defense against overkill of more than
100 leaves overkill.

3. With plausible technological break-throughs the
shores of the United States can be shielded
against military assault.

3. See proposition 2.

4. With sufficient nuclear delivery capability, the
military power of the USSR could be destroyed
and the U. S. spared a counterblow.

4. Hardened missile sites and submarine based
missiles on both sides renders this strategy inoperative.

5. A nuclear war would be composed of a series
of nuclear weapons exchanges.

5. Major portions of military communication networks would be destroyed. Under stress of
combat some military and civilian leaders could
be expected to react independently, releasing
the nuclear weapons at their command. (For
example the Commander of a Polaris Submarine
has control of 16 missiles carrying the equivalent of 8 megatons of TNT.)

6. For military security a lead must be held in all
relevant research and technology, together with
a preponderance of military materiel.

6. This assumption is nullified by propositions 1
and 2 (above).
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7. The total strength of our military system is
maximized by improving the strength of each
component.

8. We must be co
contingencies.

-:. ~

7. Our total military power cannot be defined as
the sum of the parts. Sub-optimization-making
a better warhead, a better anti-missile missile,
a better vehicle-is the prevailing approach of
the Department of Defense, despite its nullification by propositions 1 and 2 (above).

llt to cope with all military

8. The United States is a wealthy society but not
an infinitely wealthy society. For example, incomplete protection from fallout, which could
cost 50 to 300 billion dollars, can only be
gained at the expense of generating economic
weakness which in turn weakens the security
of the United States.

9. The United States must be prepared to absorb
a nuclear first strike and have sufficient reserve
power to strike back, punish the aggressor, and
stop hostilities.

9. In 1960, Dr. Jerome Wiesner advised that studies by the U.S. Army and Navy indicated that
two hundred secured missiles would be an adequate deterrent. We now posess 940 such missiles. The assumption that we need additional
weapons to destroy Soviet missiles and allied
weapons overlooks the relatively small Soviet
delivery capability (and the relatively invulnerable Soviet Polaris-type submarines). The
Soviets would have to use their entire strength
in a first blow in order to minimize the power
of the counter-attack. Our counter-attack on
military targets would be on empty holes.

10. Preeminent military power is the decisive requirement for successful conduct of American
foreign policy.

10. When potential opponents each possess more
than 100 times overkill, neither can be preeminent. Over 600 million Chinese went under
Communist rule while the West had a nuclear
monopoly. Industrial-economic power is crucial
for shaping the social and political systems of
developing nations.

PRESENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MILITARY ECONOMY
Present Assumptions
1. As our economy enlarges its military research
and production for ourselves and our allies, we
stimulate our domestic economy and remove the
drain on our gold reserves.

Present Conditions
1. Military production is inhibiting investment
in the civilian economy; military expenditures
abroad have converted our favorable balance of
trade into an unfavorable balance of payments,
which results in a drain on our gold reserve and
jeopardizes the value of the dollar. Military research and production has preempted two-thirds
of our engineering and scientific personnel.

2. The recent and recommended scale of military
spending does not undermine the traditional features of the American economic system.

2. The Department of Defense has imposed restraints and increasingly detailed regulation upon
industrial contractors who produce over 20% of
all manufactures.
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